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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 400, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 25, 1979

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO N-472

The Honorable Jimmy Carter
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Given the critical policy concerns facing the nation over the next few years, many of which will depend heavily on U.S. intelligence capabilities, we feel compelled to express the Committee's view on the implications of the evolving fiscal policy relative to intelligence.

Working closely with you and your chief aides, the Select Committee on Intelligence has devoted a great deal of time and energy examining U.S. intelligence capabilities and needs in the context of foreign policy goals. Our efforts in this regard have been sharpened by the Committee's study of the monitorability of the recently-concluded strategic arms agreement. SALT II requirements and other emerging national policy concerns suggest to us that our current intelligence capabilities are likely to be severely strained over the coming years.

We are concerned that future policy needs, particularly when coupled with a dynamic and expanding foreign policy and defense needs, mandate the strengthening and improvement of U.S. intelligence capabilities across a broad spectrum. The United States needs to undertake a concerted effort to improve the quality of analysis; there is a vital need to modernize the signals intelligence system; there is a need to provide more flexibility, better reliability and more redundancy for U.S. monitoring systems; and, as the experience of Iran shows, we must begin now to decrease our dependence on foreign territories for critical intelligence missions.

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The Committee's detailed examination over the past two years of the ability of the U.S. monitoring system to determine whether the Soviet Union is abiding by the terms of the SALT II accords provides clear evidence of both the austerity and fragility of some of our key monitoring systems. We must be able to provide strong assurances that these capabilities will be strengthened and maintained in a strong state of readiness throughout the life of the Treaty. In an era of military parity with our principal potential adversary, the need for timely, unambiguous intelligence becomes even more crucial to our national interests.

Moreover, it is increasingly evident that, in the years ahead, the U.S. intelligence system is going to be called upon to respond to a much greater and more complex range of policy concerns than in the past. Although the threat of military attack will continue to be of major concern, international political and economic issues, such as energy and other scarce natural resources, are likely to pose an equally formidable threat to our national security. Intelligence capabilities to cope with these kinds of issues cannot be developed and put in place overnight, as a number of recent international crises have clearly demonstrated.


We want to be sure that these problems and their implications for the future of the U.S. intelligence system are given thorough consideration by both the Administration and by the Congress. We are concerned that there should be a cohesive relationship between U.S. foreign policy goals and the role intelligence must play in achieving these goals. In order to achieve these goals, the intelligence system should not be curtailed by short-term fiscal constraints.

Careful planning and a strong commitment by the national leadership in both the Executive and Legislative branches to increase our investment in U.S. intelligence over the next several years are required to ensure that the intelligence system will be able to respond adequately to our future policy needs. This may require difficulties for other national priorities, but we believe such a commitment must be made and sustained; any other course would not be in the national interest. We would appreciate your personal views on this matter, particularly concerning the key investment decisions


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you believe are necessary to strengthen the U.S. intelligence system over the long term. We stand ready to meet with you on these vital matters should you wish.

Respectfully,



Birch Bayh
Chairman



Barry Goldwater
Vice Chairman

c: ✓ Admiral Stansfield Turner

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Routing Slip

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3	DD/RM		X (by LDX to [redacted])		
4	DD/NFA				
5	DD/CT				
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7	DD/O				
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	LC		X		
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12	Compt				
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